Likewise members with social goals join

Likewise, members with social goals join the TB as they see in this alternative market an instrument to meet new people, extend their social network, be of help to their neighbors and, in short, nurture social capital by bonding and developing trust with one another (Collom, 2008; North, 2014). Therefore, it mCAP is expected that, to meet these goals, members should exchange with one another. If they do not exchange, they will fail to meet new people and establish a rapport, practices that are the basis for the trust creation (Válek & Jašíková, 2013). This rationale also suggests that members with social goals conduct greater transactions. Yet, there is plenty of evidence to suggest otherwise. First, several studies have shown that more members are willing to offer services but reluctant to ask for any (Papaoikonomou & Valor, 2016). However, one of the key features of timebanking is that it is based on generalized reciprocity. This principle makes the working of timebanking different from traditional forms of volunteerism. Rather than differentiating between helpers and helped, volunteers and beneficiaries, timebanking relies on members adopting the role of coproducers by both asking for services and offering their skills (Amanatidou, Gritzas, & Kavoulakos, 2015). Gregory (2012) refers to this phenomenon of reluctance to ask for services as the “credit hoarding” effect which leads to the collapse of the TB, as it creates a similar effect to that of “lemon markets”. Or, if the TB does not collapse, it is restructured as a space for debate and group activities, but person-to-person transactions remain limited or nonexistent; the TB is reshaped into a civil society space where the exchange network plays a marginal, if any, role (Valor & Papaoikonomou, 2016). Abounding on that, other work (Carnero, Martinez, & Sánchez-Mangas, 2015) has shown that there is a correlation between membership and unemployment rate and that demand of services is more related to wants and needs. The aforementioned research by Collom (2011) also found that users with economic needs engaged in greater transactions. We suggest that membership may be sufficient for the enactment of the lifestyle that members with political and social goals seek to affiliate with. They show support for the values that the TB incarnates by joining and offering services. Their commitment is symbolically realized. Yet, for demanding services users should exhibit other goals, such as learning or acquiring skills and/or having access to services they could not afford otherwise. This symbolic saturation of motivation by mere adherence has also been suggested in the nonprofit literature. For instance, to explain why volunteers drop out immediately after initial training, urine has been suggested that they have established their commitment to the ‘idea’ of the project (Yanay & Yanay, 2008). Likewise, in volunteering, Hooghe (2003) argued that passive participation serves to achieve goals, but they failed to specify what goals.
Method
Findings Table 3 shows the main descriptive statistics of the variables used in estimation sample of the submodel 3 (n=159) (that which uses all the variables). Table 4 shows the estimates of the first model. Table 5 shows the estimates of the second model. It should be noted that, in Poisson and Logit models, the usual interpretation of coefficients as marginal effects cannot be directly done (Long, 1997). However, to test the hypotheses, it is sufficient to assess the sign and the significance of the parameters. The Log likelihood and AIC indicators and the growing pseudo R2 in both models provide evidence of the greater explanatory power and significance of the third submodel; that is, this is the one to be interpreted. It should be noticed that the focal variables are consistently significant across submodels. Length of membership (log) presents a significantly inverted U-shaped relationship with both the number of transactions and the probability of being active in the TB. This should be interpreted in the following way: an individual made more transactions and is more active in the TB at the beginning of their membership, but after some months, the more time in the TB, the fewer transactions a member made (or his or her probability of being an active member was lessened). The threshold value where the effect of length of membership changes its sign can be estimated from both models (as exp[−blength/(2*bsquared length)]) and takes a value of 14.2 months (number of transactions model) or 17.6 months (activity model).