The obtained sequence was deposited in GenBank under

The obtained sequence was deposited in GenBank under accession number MG703576; it showed a 99% identify with sample HE817764, reported as Demodex cornei, and with JF784000, reported as D. canis. Molecular and phylogenetic analyses and the morphological characteristics helped to rule out D. cornei. The phylogenetic tree shows a close relationship between the sample obtained from the hedgehog in this study and those identified as D. canis from China and D. cornei from Spain (Fig. 1). Skin samples were collected on the 7th, 14th, and 28th days after administering the dose of afoxalaner/milbemycin oxime (Nexgard Spectra, Merial). There was no evidence of erythema on day 14, and there were no lesions after 30 days. The study was reviewed and endorsed by the Ethics Committee of the Autonomous University of the State of Mexico.
CONCLUSIONS D. canis can cause demodicosis in African hedgehogs. This case represents the first report of D. canis on an African hedgehog to the best of the author's knowledge. The diagnosis was previously confirmed using molecular nucleic 9-cis-Retinoic Acid australia techniques and morphology characteristics. The infestation responded well to the use of afoxolaner/milbemycin oxime at a dose of 2.5 mg/kg.
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Introduction To have good friends and a loving family is, to many, second to nothing but indispensable necessities of life. Human relations, however, are notoriously difficult and often produce distress, regardless of economic progress or wealth. Take, for example, the question of intimacy. People often have conflicting sentiments, wanting simultaneously independence and attachment, both fearing and craving those around them. If individuals could resolve their internal conflicts they would know how close they want to be from others, but then a second problem arises. Some people may prefer to be emotionally closer and others emotionally more distant. If, say, two people prefer to be at different distances then someone always wants to move. This leads to a cat-and-mouse game that does not settle deterministically. This paper is organized as follows: The model is in Section 2. Main results are in Section 3. Section 4 discusses future work. Section 5 concludes. Proofs are in the Appendix.
Model Let be the set of real numbers. Player chooses . Player ’s payoff is . Let be the set of (Borel) probability measures on the real line. A (Nash) equilibrium is a pair , such that where is the expectation operator associated with the product Borel measure on (the same holds with or replaced with . In a pure strategy (Nash) equilibrium, assigns probability one to a single point , . Assume, at first, that , where . In this case, players care about by how much one’s attitude exceeds (or fall’s short) the other’s.
Assume that , where is player ’s optimal distance and there is a quadratic loss to be away from the optimal distance. The results in this paper do not rely upon quadratic loss. The point of interest in this example is how seemingly harmonious the players seem to be if we just focus on their payoffs. It does not matter to the players if one takes attitude and or if they exchange attitudes. Both players only care about : the distance between their attitudes. The only difference between the players is that one may prefer their attitudes to closer and the other may prefer their attitudes to be further apart. This difference in preferences, no matter how small (i.e., ), suffices to create a hedgehog dilemma. Naturally, whether or not there is a hedgehog dilemma that depends on the payoffs. There may be one even if players care about their attitudes by themselves and not just on their position relative to other players. For example, let be any linear function and let be any positive number. Assume that . So, all things considered, players may prefer to have either higher or lower attitudes, i.e.,  can be increasing or decreasing. Even if they have the exact same direct preferences over these attitudes, when players have different optimal distances, i.e., , there is still a hedgehog dilemma, however small the factor might be (in fact there is no pure strategy equilibria for all , except for a single value, see Remark 1 in the Appendix).