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  • Furthermore when analysed under the light

    2018-11-13

    Furthermore, when analysed under the light of Foucault\'s archaeology, Veblen\'s proposal can be interpreted as a discourse “waiting to happen”. Foucault\'s archaeology of knowledge is marked by the existence of strong discontinuities between different epistemic periods in the history of knowledge. In The Order of Things there were two radical discontinuities separating three epistemes. On the other hand, it is fundamental to keep in mind that within the same epistemic conditions there are not thick borders separating different sciences. Because political economy and biology shared the same conditions of possibility, they must be open to interdiscursive practice between themselves. Therefore, a Foucauldian way to read the critical moment of the history of economic thought focused here is that, in the modern episteme, the total set of relations that unite the discursive practices gave rise to the epistemological figure of non-teleology in economics, and, in particular, this happened in a set of texts associated to the author called “Veblen”.
    Final remarks
    Introduction Two of the most important opinion research institutes in Brazil, Sensus and Datafolha, collect measures of the President\'s public evaluation, providing their poll respondents with three alternative answers to his/her performance: positive, regular and negative. The former president of Brazil, Luis Inácio Lula da Silva (Lula) reached a staggering positive rate of 72.5% in February 2009. By adding the proportion of respondents that evaluated the president as being regular, which is the rating that we define as “approval”, the figure rises to an outstanding 94.2%, making him one of the most popular presidents in the history of Brazil. In the first hundred days in office, the “honeymoon” period, Lula\'s average positive rating was at nearly 50%. Even after the end of this period, ratings never fell below 29% positive evaluation. As well as analyzing the fascinating case of Lula\'s high popularity vis a vis the economic and political scenario, the importance of the present paper rests on three further factors. First of all, Brazil is the largest and wealthiest country in Latin America. With a LDE225 of more than 190 million, it represents 34% of Latin America\'s total population, and its 2006 GDP of approximately US$ 1.1 billion, corresponds to nearly 38% of the region\'s figure. This paper has three further sections, besides this introduction. Section 2 discusses the economical and political background while Section 3 presents the related literature concerning government evaluation and economic performance. Section 4 describes the methodological approach and the dataset explored in the empirical tests. The estimation results are presented and discussed in Section 5. Finally, the concluding remarks are presented.
    Economic LDE225 and political background
    Literature review The literature that focuses on the evaluation of political leaders based on economic performance is diverse. Some of the papers consider that economic voting is based on the idea that the electorate relies, at least in part, on past economic performance when evaluating the incumbent relative to alternative candidates. Aggregate data usually supports the perception that in presidential and congressional elections, the incumbent gets credit for good economic times and is blamed for bad ones. Kramer (1971) was one of the first to show such evidence for the USA – Kinder and Kiewiet (1981), Peltzman (1990) and Leigh and Wolfers (2006) are additional references that give support to the same idea. Regarding other single-country studies analyzed by the most recent literature, Jordahl (2006) also found evidence that good macroeconomic conditions increase the number of votes received by the incumbent government in Sweden. Concerning a Latin-American country, Cerda and Vergara (2007) use a panel of Chilean municipalities and conclude that a rise in the national rate of unemployment decreases the incumbent\'s share of votes in presidential elections. Finally, shedding light on multi-country studies, Brender and Drazen (2005) evaluate how the probability of reelection of chief executives is affected by fiscal behavior in a panel of countries between 1960 and 2003. The results indicate that voters do not reward politicians who engage in an election-year budget manipulation. In developed countries and consolidated democracies, the result is the opposite and suggests that voters are more likely to return chief executives to power if ovaries have promoted reductions in the debt to GDP ratio. This suggests that voters in developed and in developing countries are influenced differently by the economic policies carried out by their respective governments.